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I. Background 
Recently, Thomas Andrew Simonds, S.J., wrote an article addressing the 
status of embryonic human life. I In it he proposes the possibility of dividing early 
embryonic life into three stages. He holds this division to reflect contemporary 
language more accurately, since these three stages incorporate "observable and 
significant" developmental changeS: 
In this new conversation, we will use some current terminology to describe our 
biological observations. Rather than using Aquinas' terms to talk about development, 
i.e. animation, souls, and ensoulment; we will use these terms: human life, awareness, 
and the process of developing awareness. Based upon our biological observations, we 
will divide the first forty days of development into three stages. The stages are used to 
show that an observable and significant change has taken place in the developing 
embryo or fetus. As our criteria for what constitutes significant change may differ, our 
delineation of the three stages may differ somewhat. Therefore, we outline these three 
stages in a tentative way pending dialogue and conversation with others.2 
He bases such division on current biological data: 
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In stage I we have human life. In this stage, the genetic code will guide the formation of 
the cells that make up the embryonic body. These cells will differentiate themselves and 
become specialized. Some cells will be designated to form the heart, while others will be 
tapped to form the lungs and the brain. The process of conception is completed at around 
fifteen days with implantation in the uterine wall. When implantation occurs, stage II 
begins, which is individual human life. At forty days after Fertilization, Stage III begins, 
individually aware human life. As early as forty, and definitely by sixty days after 
fertilization, we can detect brain waves in the fetus. This is an important observation 
because the presence of brain waves tells us that the brain is receiving sensory input. The 
fetus now experiences awareness.) 
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Defining stage I as "human life" and stage II as "individual human life" might 
imply that there is no individual human life before implantation. This, however, 
is not substantiated by current biological data. 
II. Biological Data 
We now know that at completed fertilization, the human embryo contains all the 
genetic material necessary for development. We also know that, genetically, 
fertilization involves the fusion of the fertilizing spennatozoon pronucleus with the 
secondary oocyte pronucleus. Since these two pronuclei are haploid, we further 
know that the resulting diploid zygotic nucleus constitutes a unique genome at the 
biochemical level. Lastly, for our argument, we know that even the extranuclear 
genetic material contained in intracellular organelles (such as mitochondria, 
ribosomes, etc.) is also biochemically unique to each individual zygote.4 
Thus, provided the zygote is living and is the result of the fusion of a human spenn 
with a human egg, one can conclude that the human zygote already qualifies as 
individual human life. In fact, if observable and significant developmental change is 
the operative criterion for differentiating between stages, then the first completed 
zygotic mitosis is a much more significant event than implantation. Why? Because 
first cleavage marks the true onset of differentitation, whereas during implantation 
the blastocyst is well along the differentiation process. That is why the conventional 
beginning stage II in (human) embryology is the first completed mitosis of the 
individual zygote and not implantation.5 
m. Twinning 
Twins originate from two fertilized eggs (dizygotic), or from a single fertilized egg 
which undergoes complete or partial separation before implantation (monozygotic). 
Since dizygotic twins develop from two genetically distinct zygotes, their 
individuality from completed fertilization is not in question. Monozygotic twins, on 
the other hand, develop from a single zygote, which means that they have almost 
identical genomes.6 One must bear in mind, however, that even monozygotic twins 
are true individuals, as evidenced by many living identical twins who lead nonnal, 
healthy, individual lives. In the United States, monozygotic twins occur about once in 
every 300 pregnancies.7 
The question arises; how can the zygote that generates monozygotic twins be 
considered an individual? The answer to this question lies in the well established 
natural occurence of asexual reproduction. In other words, it is entirely plausible for 
an individual zygote to undergo total separation at first cleavage so as to result in two 
new individual zygotes. Each one of these zygotes can then continue nonnal 
development into two individual embryos. Alternatively, an individual zygote can 
develop into an individual morula through nonnal mitosis. Subsequently, some 
blastomeres fonning the morula fully separate before implantation, giving rise to two 
distinct blastocysts. Each one of the blastocysts can then further develop into 
individual embryos. At every stage of the aforesaid scenarios one observes 
individuals: an individual zygote which generates another individual zygote; an 
individual morula which generates another individual morula. If viable, all qualify as 
individual human life.8 
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IV. Dialogue 
Simonds also mentions that: "In our current paradigm, conception is a process 
lasting fifteen days. Therefore, moral questions during this period of time would 
focus on the question of preventing conception rather than aborting an already 
conceived embryo."9 This view of conception, however, stands in contrast with 
the standard medical definition of fertilization: "The process beginning with 
penetration of the secondary oocyte by the spermatozoon and completed by the 
fusion of the male and female pronuc1ei."lo 
If the process ural dimension of fertilization can be used to expand conception 
until nidation of the blastocyst into the endometrium; why stop at implantation? 
Consistency would demand that the entire gestation be seen as one continual 
process, making conception coextensive with all nine months of human 
pregnancy! In the final analysis, then, one realizes that Simonds' proposal is no 
different from a proportionalist view of early embryonic life which attributes to 
the human embryo incremental value as development occurs. I I 
V. Conclusion 
Recently, the National Institutes of Health has decided to federally fund 
research and experimentation on early embryonic human life. 12 Also, the federal 
government has decided to proceed with medical trials on the French 
"contragestation" pill (RU486).13 Both these actions reflect the erroneous notion 
that human embryonic life before implantation is somehow "less than" human, 
and therefore available for research and disposal. Given the general confusion 
regarding the status and value of early embryonic human life, it is imperative that 
our contemporary language reflect our present knowledge on the subject: it can 
now be stated that current biological observation corroborates the existence of 
individual human life from completed fertilization. Therefore, the moral question 
of experimenting and discarding embryonic human life before implantation, 
focuses on abortion rather than on preventing conception. 
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